| Regiment | 6th Wiltshire |
|---|---|
| Location | France, In the Trenches |
| Entry | Lessons learnt (1) The urgent necessity for pushing forward Lewis Guns to deal with the advanced hostile M.Gs which work from positions well in advance of the leading infantry. (2) The value of covering fire and fire control in rearguard actions. This means accurate sighting of rifles, economy of ammunition in addition to the ordinary meaning of the terms Ammunition was wasted, and rifles were rarely correctly sighted. (3) The collecting of men into "blobs" in the course of a withdrawal. This was clearly demonstrated on the 24th March when the enemy shelled intensely the ground which had to be passed over, and very few casualties were sustained. (4) The grave danger of acquiring the idea that a withdrawal is necessary if the flanks fall away. H. Lloyd Williams Major. 9th Welch Regt 10p.m. 2/4/18 Lessons learnt in Operation 21/28 March 1918 (I) That close communication between posts and units is unnecessary if co-operation and mutual support is established. Failure to realize this caused premature withdrawal from good positions. (II) That small determined bodies of troops could always hold up superior numbers of the enemy if their flanks are covered by supporting fire. Even if not so covered resolute stands were always successful in checking advance and compelling enemy to alter his tactics. Enemy never faced steady and controlled frontal fire in their advance. (III) That the enemy seldom pushed a frontal attack always relying on flanking movement to turn us out of our positions. (IV) That the enemy by means of small lights thrown up by first waves of infantry had an effective and rapid means of informing his artillery at what position he was held in check. (V) That enemy machine guns were well to the front at each advance and were rapidly in position at each check and materially assisted his advance especially when a crossfire was opened in our positions. (VI) That the majority of our troops did not understand rearguard actions and during the early stages of the retirement, troops withdrew in bunches no covering fire being brought to bear and no delaying action fought. (VII) That the general tendency was to withdraw to high ground which rapidly came under shell fire and long range machine gun fire; the valleys were often ignored allowing enemy to make use of dead ground. (VIII) That there was a useless waste of S.A.A. of Lewis Guns and rifles at long ranges resulting in a serious shortage when enemy came under short effective ranges. (IX) That in a general retirement it is absolutely necessary for Staff Officers (if possible mounted) to be present at the successive lines of resistance to control and direct the withdrawal and delaying actions of large masses of infantry which the various units of which inevitably become mixed. Alan Garthwaite Captain 6th Wiltshire Regt. 2.4.18. Notes from MAJOR MONREAL Dear Garthwaite, To my mind the tactical lessons of the stint are:- 1. That no number of lines of trenches is impregnable against a superior enemy determined to pay the price of capture. 2. That the defensive value of obstacles has been materially discounted by the latest weapons of demolition. 3. That defending infantry unsupported by artillery and aircraft is paralysed in the face of the combined aircraft, artillery and infantry of the enemy. 4. That machine guns in trenches are doomed to destruction by hostile artillery where the latter has established a superiority over opposing artillery. 5. That everything considered, the instructions of the Offr, NCO and men in open warfare has again become an essential part of training. |
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